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Abstract 
Historically vouchers, which provide a sum of money to parents for private education, were tools 
of racist oppression; but in recent decades some advocates claim them as ‘the civil rights issue of 
our time.’ This paper brings an analytic-historical perspective rooted in racial orders to understand 
how education vouchers have been reincarnated and reinvented since the Jim Crow era. 
Combining original primary research with statistical analysis we identify multiple concurrent and 
consecutive transformations in voucher politics in three arenas of racial policy alliance 
contestation: expansion of color-blind policy designs, growing legal and political support from a 
conservative alliance, and a smorgasbord of voucher rationales rooted in color-blind framing. This 
approach demonstrates that education vouchers have never been racially neutral but served key 
roles in respect to prevailing racial hierarchies and contests. 
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The renaissance of education vouchers in America is indisputable and striking (Figure 1).i While 
modern proponents of education vouchers cite numerous motives, the majority are at pains to 
promote them as ‘color-blind’ or ‘race neutral’ measures, to use King and Smith’s (2011, 2014) 
language. Color-blind advocates of vouchers claim the race of the children participating is 
irrelevant to the policy even though it is an activist program nominally targeting the educationally 
disadvantaged (Levitz 2017). In contrast, proponents of an active federal role to ameliorate 
enduring racial inequalities rarely advocate education vouchers, concluding that they are 
commonly designed by white Republican Party lawmakers and used by white parents to 
perpetuate de facto segregated education amongst American children (Ford, Johnson, and 
Partelow 2017). 
The contemporary debate about education vouchers has unmissable historical echoes 
reflecting first the origin of voucher schemes in the 1950s when they were used as instruments to 
maintain racial segregation, and second their redesign after the 1960s, principally by opponents of 
racial progress, to accommodate the civil rights era. This paper brings an analytic-historical 
perspective rooted in racial orders to understand how education vouchers have been reincarnated 
and reinvented since Milton Friedman first formalized the idea in 1955 (Friedman 1955). 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We argue that the politics of such schemes – variously called tuition grants, tax credit 
scholarships, educational savings accounts or vouchers – is related to the dominant racial order at 
each historical juncture in American politics. Vouchers buttressed white supremacy during public 
school desegregation by funding segregated private schools. They were opposed by civil rights 
organizations but attracted some advocates for racial equality during the 1990s as a remedy for 
educational inequalities. But during President Obama’s first term vouchers became firmly 
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associated with the modern color-blind alliance, consisting of Republicans and conservatives who 
disclaim the use of racial categories in policymaking. Our approach enables us to demonstrate that 
education vouchers have never been racially neutral but served key roles in respect to these 
prevailing racial hierarchies.ii   
In the era of segregated education in the decades up to 1964, vouchers emerged as an 
instrument developed by white supremacists to maintain that racial order as it was under threat 
from court orders and federal actions. Responding to the Brown (1954) decision ordering school 
desegregation, school districts offered tuition grants to white parents to remove their white 
children from public schools which had been ordered to integrate.iii Tuition grant vouchers funded 
segregated institutions indirectly – channeling money via parents rather than directly to the school 
– in an effort to avoid legal challenge, but activists and judges exposed their racist purposes. In 
the 1960s and 1970s as civil and voting rights legislation transformed the segregationist order into 
a new civil rights regime, so proponents of racial equality worked to end the use of tuition grants 
in the South. More generally they opposed the use of voucher type schemes since these included 
the potential racially to discriminate between children.  
Some liberal academics and progressive policymakers supported vouchers or tax credit 
voucher programs for the educationally disadvantaged, but growing racial and ideological 
polarization from the 1980s pushed vouchers firmly into conservatives’ issue preferences (Forman 
2004). In the post-civil rights era embedded from the 1980s, American voters’ partisan and 
ideological polarization (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016) has increasingly overlapped with a 
racial division between conservative color-blind and liberal race-conscious policy alliances: loose 
configurations of individuals and groups seeking to disclaim or deploy racial categories in 
policymaking, respectively (D. King and Smith 2011, 2014). This polarized context provides an 
opportunity for politicians associated with the conservative color-blind alliance to promote 
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voucher type schemes which in practice contribute to keeping schools segregated (Katz and 
Turner 2001; Persson 2015; Reardon and Yun 2002).  
Modern vouchers have some race-conscious supporters – liberals and Democrats committed 
to the use of racial categories in policymaking – but their support base is overwhelmingly color-
blind. Since the 1990s, some of these color-blind advocates of vouchers have maintained that such 
schemes will be beneficial to African-American children and parents, but most are anxious to 
deny that vouchers result in race targeted effects. Proponents lobbied states to hold referenda to 
enact them. The overwhelming rejection of the schemes after such referenda prompted a strategic 
shift amongst voucher advocates to enact schemes in GOP controlled state legislatures. To make 
sense of this complexity in the evolution of voucher politics over time we draw on King and 
Smith’s racial policy alliances framework to distinguish three arenas in which alliances contest: 
rhetoric, patterns of support, and policy design (Table 1). Table 1 defines the terms ‘color-blind’ 
and ‘race-conscious’ for policy framing, design and support (columns 1 and 2), and situates the 
components of the King-Smith analytical framework in context (column 3).  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
King and Smith’s two racial policy alliances represent broad alignments rather than precise 
specifications of tight coalition partners. In this paper we show how the framework can be 
calibrated and applied in an analytic-historical way to the development of school vouchers as 
these schemes move through their shifting incarnations.  We argue that these arenas of racial 
policy alliance contestation – rhetoric, patterns of support and policy design – are analytically 
separable, which means that race-conscious policy alliance members do not always espouse race-
conscious arguments and race-conscious policy designs may be publicly justified in a color-blind 
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fashion. In King and Smith’s book Still a House Divided race-consciousness and color-blindness 
identifies frames, policies and people as illustrated in Table 1, column 3.  
For King and Smith color-blindness and race-consciousness manifests in the framing of 
racial issues and in parties’ professed commitments, whereby elites rhetorically emphasize or 
diminish racial categories (Table 1, row 1). Color-blindness and race-consciousness also occurs in 
the design and implementation of policy (Table 1, row 2). And race-conscious proponents and 
color-blind advocates form two sides of opposed racial policy alliances (Table 1, row 3). 
Distinguishing these three arenas of racial policy alliance conflict enables us to identify multiple 
concurrent and consecutive transformations in voucher politics over time.  
The tenacity of racial hierarchies in US politics and the struggles to defend or reform 
approaches to racial equality is exceptionally well illustrated in the trajectory of education 
vouchers since their introduction by states in the 1950s to their contemporary embrace by 
Republican state governors and legislators. Our account of vouchers gives a micro example of the 
broad contours sketched out in the racial policy alliances framework showing the powerful ways 
in which institutionally embedded hierarchies operate locally to maintain and retain racist legacies 
(Lieberman 1997; Anderson 2016). 
 
Vouchers and racial epochs 
In this paper we use a racial orders framework to analyze how the politics of education vouchers 
has developed since Brown and what has driven that change. Empirically, we draw upon modern 
and historical newspaper sources (1953-2017), judicial rulings, civil rights reports and census data 
to construct an analytic narrative showing how voucher programs served the interests of those 
either opposing or on rare occasions promoting egalitarian racial reform rooted in America’s 
shifting post-Civil War racial orders. We also construct two original databases, legislator votes on 
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voucher bills (2005-2017) and judicial votes in voucher cases (1955-2017), to express these 
patterns statistically.  
Our approach utilizes state legislature websites to extract information about the 6,693 
legislative votes on forty-seven voucher bills passed between 2005 and 2017. In order to address 
possible selection bias we incorporate twelve voucher bills that were brought to a vote before July 
2017 but failed to become law because they were vetoed or voted down, yielding a total of 7,851 
state legislator votes. Additionally, drawing upon the universe of judicial votes in 46 voucher cases 
(1955-2017), and 236 individual votes, we examine the legal vulnerability of voucher programs by 
recording each judge’s decision about the constitutionality of the program at issue. 
In this paper we make four key empirical and theoretical contributions. First, we unearth 
patterns of tuition voucher distribution across the Jim Crow South. To our knowledge, no existing 
account has calculated the number and distribution of tuition grant vouchers over time for multiple 
states. Secondly, we advance empirically the accounts of voucher politics articulated in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century by analyzing the rapid increase in voucher programs after 2010 
and drawing upon original datasets. Thirdly, we apply the racial orders framework developed by 
Desmond King and Rogers Smith to the elite politics of vouchers. Fourthly, our micro-empirical 
approach disaggregates the racial orders framework for the first time into its underlying dimensions – 
design, framing, and patterns of support – in order to understand how racial orders coalesce and 
fragment in different eras of contestation.  
The first section of this paper explains how vouchers originated in the 1950s as part of white 
supremacists’ struggle to resist desegregation.  Such efforts were cited as empirical examples by 
the University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman as he articulated the theoretical rationale 
for vouchers (Friedman 1955). 
During the momentous transition from the segregationist to the civil rights era achieved 
partly in laws passed by Congress in the 1960s, vouchers rarely featured in policy debates as a 
6 
 
desirable method to address racial inequality in American schools.  Instead the focus for getting 
change and reform was the combination of federal funds, adroitly granted or withheld to the states 
by the US Department of Education, and of court orders.  
In the third section we show that as the civil rights reforms of the 1960s settled into the new 
alliances and struggles of the 1970s and 1980s, so opponents of federal-backed racial equality 
revived and redesigned school vouchers for the modern era to block reform. Table 2 illustrates the 
forms of racial policy alliance contestation in patterns of support, rhetoric, and policy design 
during the three eras of voucher politics: Jim Crow and the aftermath of Brown (1950-64); the Era 
of Transition (1964-96); and the Civil Rights Era and Rise of Color-Blind Vouchers (1996-). The 
analysis in the paper is organized around these three eras and shifts between them.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Expanding upon King and Smith’s racial orders framework, we show how the reinvention of 
vouchers took place in three key arenas of racial policy alliance contestation summarized in Table 2: 
patterns of support; framing and rhetoric; and design and targets. Tracing the temporality of voucher 
politics reveals a trend toward color-blindness punctuated by sporadic race-conscious rationales and 
coalition-building.iv The revival of racial divides in contemporary voucher use is an empirical 
surprise but consistent with the deep legacies of racism in America identified by King and Smith and 
others (Brandwein 2011; Chen 2009; Harris 2012; Hochschild 1996; Francis 2014; Mazumder 2018; 
Mickey 2015; Murakawa 2014; Thurston 2015; Lowndes, Novkov, and Warren 2008; Gillion 2016), 
and mobilized in recent electoral politics (Bobo 2017; Coates 2017; Tesler 2016). 
The racial orders framework guides the empirical analysis by providing explanations for 
the varying political purpose of vouchers at different historical stages. The use of vouchers took 
place in three distinct waves corresponding to the King-Smith racial orders and eras of racial 
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policy alliance contestation: as part of the pro-segregationist anti-Brown resistance, during the 
brief race-conscious response to urban school crises, and in the explosion of color-blind vouchers 
paralleling the Obama presidency (D. King and Smith 2005; Johnson 2011, 2016).  
Within each era we show how color-blind and race-conscious forces sought to make and 
unmake racial hierarchies by building coalitions, re-framing public debate and crafting policy. 
This periodization is close to the King and Smith (2011) framework. But our micro empirical 
focus enables us to expand their account of the post-1970s decades by delineating the distinct 
bases of support found among some race-conscious advocates versus the overwhelming color-
blind mobilization base for vouchers. These nuances have been missed in many existing broad 
stroke accounts of changes in racial politics since the 1960s.  
There are competing accounts about vouchers. The most compelling is religious activism, 
from which we distinguish our analysis. Although most vouchers are used at religious schools and 
many religious elites support vouchers, we find explanations rooted in racial policy alliances more 
analytically compelling for three reasons. First, religious leaders have historically played a weak 
or ambivalent role in the formation of voucher coalitions, ranging from reluctant Midwest 
Catholic dioceses to outright hostility from Texan Baptist groups (Hackett 2016). As we show in 
Part 2 of this paper, voucher activism in the 1990s was propelled by coalitions organized around 
racial justice with Catholic organizations in a supporting role. Racial policy alliances – rather than 
culture war categories – can more usefully describe the patterns of support of individuals and 
groups advocating for and against vouchers.  
Secondly, the movement from ‘values’ arguments  to racial justice claims through to 
‘color-blind’ framing of vouchers, mark significant shifts in vouchers’ evolution (Forman 2007). 
Race-conscious and color-blind frames are meaningful in judicial decision-making. The 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment restricts arguments for vouchers couched in terms 
of benefits for religious individuals or institutions, but not those framed in terms of racial justice, 
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individual choice or school quality. Thirdly, voucher policies have been designed explicitly to 
accomplish racial goals, having their genesis in and responses to the Brown v Board decision. As 
we show in Part 1 of this paper, tuition grant legislation in the Jim Crow era explicitly excluded 
sectarian schools from participation. We do not deny the importance of religion in propelling 
voucher activism on occasion but find evidentially that racial policy alliances is a more 
compelling explanation for vouchers’ patterns of support, rhetoric, and policy design and how 
they change over time. 
 
Part 1. Vouchers and Segregationist America 
Origins and number of vouchers 
The first school voucher programs were adopted in the South in response to Brown v Board of 
Education (1954)v (Ladson-Billings 2004; Harter and Hoffman 1973).vi Their purpose was 
defined by ardent defenders of the segregationist racial order. These programs were designed to 
enable white families to escape any desegregation of the public schooling system by utilizing 
publicly-funded vouchers distributed by all-white school districts to send their children to private 
de facto segregated academies (Ford, Johnson, and Partelow 2017). This tactic was embraced to 
maintain the South’s system of white supremacy (Schickler and Rubin 2016).  
The laws authorized public funding for grant payments to parents to spend on private 
education for their children. Seven southern states passed tuition grant laws: Alabama (1955), 
Georgia (1953vii), Louisiana (1958viii), Mississippi (1964), North Carolina (1956), South Carolina 
(1963) and Virginia (1956ix). For these states, buttressing separate schools was a pivotal 
component of segregation. In an eighth state, Arkansas, a publicly-funded tuition grant bill was 
introduced but never reached the governor’s desk. Instead policymakers successfully solicited 
private funding for tuition grants (Special to the New York Times 1959, 1961).  
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The tuition grant programs were to be used for ‘segregation academies,’ single-race private 
schools, established in direct response to Brown. Catholic or ‘sectarian’ schools were excluded 
from these tuition grant programs, partly due to anti-Catholicism in the South and partly to the 
fear that Catholic schools would soon start to desegregate (as, indeed, they did in many parts of 
the South during the early 1960s) (Carl 2011; Special to the New York Times 1964). 
Compiling data on the number of grants issued during this period is challenging because 
official records are incomplete and inadequate. We triangulate between contemporary newspaper 
sources, judicial rulings and reports of the United States Commission on Civil Rights in order to 
piece together – for the first time – the trajectory of grant issuance across states.  
Of the tuition-grant states Louisiana and Virginia distributed the largest number of grants. In 
its first year of operation Louisiana issued 535 tuition grants but the number quickly rose to 7,093 
in its second year (1962-63) and to 11,000 the following year (Hannah et al. 1964; Wisdom 1968; 
McBee 1963). In 1966, the number of grants peaked at 15,177, followed by 14,059 in 1967-68, 
after which the program was struck down by a federal district court (Wisdom 1968).  
The value of the grants was initially set at $1.67 per day and later raised to $2 per day, or 
$360 for an assumed school year of 180 days, which was typically sufficient to cover all or most 
of private school fees (Wisdom 1968). We utilize data appendices attached to the Poindexter v 
Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission case (1968) to calculate the average tuition charge in 
private schools set up in Louisiana after the Brown decision: $414 per annum.x Hence the grants 
covered, on average, 87% of fees. Judges in many states noted that tuition grants were calibrated 
to the level of school fees, and vice versa (Wisdom 1968, 1961; Rives, Grooms, and Johnson 
1964). Many segregated schools set up after Brown, such as Carrollton Private School, Mirabeau 
Elementary School, United Elementary School, and Jefferson Academy, charged precisely the 
cost of the tuition grant.  
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These vouchers were used almost exclusively by whites although a small number of black 
students did use tuition grants to attend segregated academies (Godbold, Cox, and Russell 1969). 
In Coffey v State Education Finance Commission (1969) the vigilant judges provided a detailed 
data appendix on patterns of voucher usage to justify their conclusion that Mississippian tuition 
grants were unconstitutional.xi The Court found that all but one of the private schools receiving 
the $240 tuition grant payments in the school year 1967-8 had an all-white attendance (the other 
school was entirely African-American) (Godbold, Cox, and Russell 1969). 
In Virginia the state dispensed 4,750 grants in the school year beginning in 1959 at a cost of 
just over $1 million (Carper 1960b), each grant amounting to $125 per child for elementary 
students and $150 for high-schoolers, supplemented by local sources (Black 1964; Butzner 1964). 
In subsequent years the number of tuition grants rose to 6,100, then 7,261, 8,518xii, and 9,489 in 
1963-64 (Associated Press 1963, 1961b, 1961a, 1960; Baker 1962; Knoll 1960; Carper 1960a; 
Muse 1964, 186). By 1964, Virginia had spent more than $7 million on tuition grant payments. 
Even after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and a 1965 Supreme Court decision striking 
down the Prince Edward County’s policy of shuttering the public school system to avoid 
desegregation, Virginia continued to fund private tuition grants (Black 1964).  
Numbers rose to 12,253 in 1964, dipping slightly to 11,983 in 1965 then climbing again to 
12,786 in 1966 and almost 14,000 in 1967. Despite declining enthusiasm for the program on the 
part of some whiter Virginian counties towards the end of the decade, particularly Roanoke, 
Arlington and Alexandria, the number of tuition grants issued in 1968 (after which they were 
struck down by a three-judge federal court) was in excess of 13,000 (Associated Press 1969). 
Over the course of a decade Virginia spent nearly $20 million in tuition grants.  
By contrast, the Georgia tuition grant program’s early promise – the state spent $1.4 million 
in 1961-2 alone – was quickly snuffed out after the legislature adopted additional regulations. 
‘The legislature provided [in 1963] that local school systems must participate in the costs and 
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certify the students for private school grants, an action that virtually killed the plan’ (Special to 
the New York Times 1967). State outlay for the grants dropped to a mere $112,000 in 1963 and 
came to a halt the following year without the need for court action (Wearne 2013). Figure 2 
displays the rise and fall of tuition grant payments in Virginia, Louisiana and Georgia, normalized 
for the size of the 5-14 year old population in each state (source: US Census data 1960). As Figure 
2 shows, at their peak around 2% of the school-age population in Louisiana and Virginia utilized 
tuition grants. But the impact of these grants was felt across the South.  
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Patterns of support for vouchers in defense of Jim Crow 
White supremacist Democratic governors including George and Lurleen Wallace of Alabama, 
Eugene Talmadge and Ernest Vandiver Jr. of Georgia, Earl Long and James Davis of Louisiana, 
Paul Johnson of Mississippi and Thomas B Stanley of Virginia, were vociferous supporters of 
tuition grant vouchers (Catsam 2009; Kruse 2005). They and their legislative allies established 
commissions to devise strategies to avoid desegregation. The Sibley Commission in Georgia (‘the 
Committee on Schools of the Georgia General Assembly’), the Pearsall Committee in North 
Carolina, and the Gray Commission in Virginia recommended tuition grants as part of packages 
of measures designed to thwart desegregation (Chin et al. 2006).  
Committee memberships were almost exclusively white and male – three African-
Americans sat on the sixteen-member Pearsall Committee in North Carolina but the Gray 
Commission in Virginia was drawn from the state legislature, which had no African-Americans 
and only one woman serving in it (Bonastia 2012, 56). Members of the Gray Commission were 
drawn disproportionately from south Virginian legislative districts with smaller populations but 
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larger concentrations of black residents, a pattern of support that would be repeated when it came 
to voting on tuition grant packages across the South. 
White segregationists shepherded tuition grant legislation through state legislatures. The 
bills did not garner uniform support. Some votes were close. But closeness reflected not 
principled objection to the racist ends of the measures but doubt about their efficacy in achieving 
widely-shared segregationist goals. Virginia’s 1956 tuition grant law passed the upper house by 
just four votes. There were legislators willing to speak out against tuition grants – but for pro-
segregationist reasons, such as expressing their fear that the ‘massive resistance’ approach would 
make federal court challenge more likely. For example, Senator Bob Wilson of Walker County, 
Alabama, argued that federal courts would force private schools to accept black students as long 
as white pupils received state aid (Associated Press 1965b). Revealingly, support for tuition grants 
was concentrated amongst members with the largest proportion of black residents in their 
districts. These were the districts that would feel the impact of desegregation most keenly 
(Bonastia 2012, 73; Muse 1961; Catsam 2009, 136).  
 
Tuition grant rhetoric: veneer of color-blindness 
The earliest segregation tuition grant efforts employed notionally color-blind arguments about 
‘freedom of choice’ and ‘freedom of association’. Mindful of the risk of judicial challenges, 
politicians publicly justified their tuition grant policies without recourse to race. In Alabama, for 
instance, the tuition grant law made no mention of race or color, providing that children could 
qualify for grants if, in the judgment of their parents, it would be detrimental to their ‘physical or 
emotional health’ or subject them to ‘hazards to personal safety’ if they attended public school. 
(Associated Press 1965a). These supposedly race-neutral frames formed part of a broader 
‘freedom of choice’ response to desegregation, purportedly allowing black children to transfer to 
white schools but in practice subjecting would-be transfer students to harassment or intimidation 
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and rejecting their applications on notionally race-neutral grounds. This language fits with the 
racial orders framework. 
Some policymakers changed the designation of the vouchers to help minimize the 
association between racist purposes and state action. Virginia for example relabeled its tuition 
grants ‘scholarships’ in 1959 and Mississippi christened its grants ‘loans’ a decade later (Bonastia 
2012, 96; Bolton 2005, 175; Muse 1961, 134). In Virginia’s Prince Edward County, local 
segregationists closed the public school system for five years rather than submit to desegregation. 
Officials justified public funding of tuition grants for students at the whites-only Prince Edward 
Academy in terms of opaque ‘patriotic constitutionalism’ rather than full blown ‘diehard 
segregation’. In this view, it was merely black parents’ irksome rejection of tuition grants for 
African-American private schools that prevented black children in the county from receiving an 
education. This perverse logic exposes the segregationist intent of tuition grants beneath the 
superficial color-blind framing. 
The thread between segregation and the modern era is palpable as we show below. The 
sociologist Chris Bonastia makes this link too: ‘In their views that tax money primarily should 
benefit the largest taxpayers, that government should fund private school education, and that 
segregation could be justified in non-racial terms, Prince Edward whites anticipated the 
“colorblind”, conservative strain of rhetoric that gained currency in the late 1960s and the 1970s, 
and that continues to strive’ (Bonastia 2012, 7–8). The racialized nature of the rights of taxpayers 
over how funds are spent persisted in America’s racial orders (Connolly 2014; Gilens 1996). 
Even in states such as Arkansas and North Carolina that passed but did not distribute tuition 
grants, the passage of tuition grant legislation had powerful symbolic functions for segregationist 
elites. It rallied supporters, roused segregationists, and placated fears of federal takeovers. In 
Arkansas, Governor Orville Faubus – famous for refusing to protect black children at Little Rock 
in 1957 – deployed the individualized rhetoric of color-blindness to express confidence that his 
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tuition grants proposal would not be overturned by the courts: ‘It is just carrying a little bit further 
the rights of an individual. All students have constitutional rights – not just members of one race 
or group, although the present Supreme Court seems interested in only one race’ (Special to the 
New York Times 1959). Grants were justified on the grounds of ‘individual liberty’ of association 
for parents and students (Carl 2011, 29).  
Despite this homage to color-blindness, policymakers in the Jim Crow South were not 
always circumspect about their segregationist purposes. Representative Risley C. Triche of 
Assumption Parish, Louisiana, for instance argued in the Louisianan House of Representatives in 
December 1960 that the grant-in-aid system was the most effective weapon against the integration 
of public schools (Peltason 1971, 228–29). Alabama Governor George C. Wallace called for 
tuition vouchers in order to hold the line against the threat of integration (Rives, Grooms, and 
Johnson 1964). 
The racist motives of the sponsors of these state schemes did not escape some judges’ 
attention. A federal district court noted in its 1967 Poindexter ruling that Louisianan officials 
enacted tuition grants to deny black students equal educational opportunities: ‘…For a hundred 
years, the Louisiana legislature has not deviated from its objective of maintaining segregated 
schools for white children. Ten years after Brown, declared policy became undeclared policy.’ 
Justice Wisdom added: ‘Open legislative defiance of desegregation orders shifted to subtle forms 
of circumvention although some prominent sponsors of grant-in-aid legislation have been less 
than subtle in their public expression. But the changes in means reflect no change in legislative 
ends’ (Wisdom 1968, emphasis added).  
The federal courts in this case, and in other segregation voucher cases, saw through the 
color-blind justifications proffered by southern politicians and struck them down as 
unconstitutional. 
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White supremacist policy design and administration 
The educational expense grants were directed according to racial criteria to support segregation 
academies, entangling the state with racist purposes. Several tuition grant programs paid state 
funds not only to parents but also to the schools directly. New segregation academies were 
‘private in name only’ (Crespino 2007, 240). Their boosters’ notionally-color-blind ‘freedom of 
choice’ rhetoric notwithstanding, these earliest voucher programs were designed specifically to 
sustain the racial hierarchies of the Jim Crow era by embedding racial categories in the design and 
administration of policy.  
Subsequent iterations of tuition grant laws excised explicit mentions of race but the racial 
purposes of the statutes were clear. Under threat of court action, states attempted to camouflage 
the connection between government and segregated academies by funding parents and not schools 
directly. A key rationale was first articulated in Borden v Louisiana (1928).xiii The Court allowed 
parents a ‘free choice’ as to where they use their state-funded tuition grant. This trope made the 
program ‘constitutional’ by benefiting the child rather than the school directly, (even if the school 
ultimately banked the money and thereby benefited ‘incidentally’, the benefit to the student was 
the statute’s primary purpose).xiv In another effort to shield their program from legal challenge, 
lawmakers in Louisiana transferred administrative authority from the state Board of Education to 
a new arms-length agency, the Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission (Carl 2011, 47).  
But these efforts to suppress the connection between state and school did not deceive federal 
courts as cases such as Griffin v County School Board of Prince Edward County reveal (Black 
1964).xv In Griffin, the ‘personal, parental, and race-conscious choice to discriminate was 
rendered de jure by virtue of state funding, which was used to support the voucher program.’ In 
effect ‘the Supreme Court thus determined that this “exercising of school choice” with a voucher 
was a violation of Brown’s desegregation mandate’ (Gooden, Jabbar, and Mario S. Torres 2016).  
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In Hall v Helena Parish (1961) the court said that tuition grant programs were a ‘transparent 
artifice’ designed to circumvent blacks' ‘constitutional right to attend desegregated public schools’ 
(Wisdom 1961).xvi In Poindexter (1967), the court stated explicitly: ‘The United States 
Constitution does not permit the State to perform acts indirectly through private persons which it 
is forbidden to do directly’ (Wisdom 1968).  
The temporality of early tuition grant vouchers reveals four different legal and political 
strategies on the part of southern states to stop desegregation using both direct and indirect 
methods (Table 3). Vouchers were an element in each strategy. 
First, states such as Virginia and Louisiana pursued immediate ‘massive resistance’ 
policies in response to Brown, a belligerent, all-in, up-front approach that incorporated school 
closings, outlawing public school desegregation, tuition grant payments and open defiance, and 
that ran the greatest risk of legal challenge. Vouchers were one part of the miasma of violent 
incidents and legal challenges by white segregationists. Secondly, other states including North 
Carolina deployed a measured approach to slow the pace of desegregation, placate segregationists 
and reduce the likelihood of court override by authorizing (but not implementing) tuition grants.  
Thirdly, border-south states - Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee - did not 
pursue tuition grants because they were resigned to at least token integration, particularly those 
with a small African-American population. Fourthly, states such as Mississippi and South 
Carolina did not pursue tuition grants at first because, at least initially, they were unnecessary. 
Policymakers were committed to absolute school segregation and ‘most blacks understandably 
feared violent or fatal repercussions if they chose to press their case legally’ (Bonastia 2012, 77). 
This last group of states did eventually adopt tuition grants, but many years later than the 
‘Massive Resistance’ group and only when these states’ bulwarks against desegregation had 
begun to crumble at last.  
 
17 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In sum, vouchers were part of the general white supremacy effort to get white children out 
of the public school system to avoid inter-racial contact. This imperative was most acute in states 
such as Virginia that overlapped the southern Black Belt, which had adopted a defiant position to 
federal desegregation law suits but could not rely upon sheer brute suppression to prevent public 
school desegregation.  
To a free market economist such as Milton Friedman it made perfect economic sense that 
racist legislatures would enact measures such as vouchers to prop up segregation in schools (and 
logically in other policies such as housing and labor markets) (Friedman 1955); indeed Friedman 
encouraged the arguments developed by University of Virginia economist James Buchanan in 
favor of opposing Brown by using vouchers (MacLean 2017, 69–70). But the practice and the 
theoretical argument were products of and integral to the political supporters of the segregationist 
racial order. Their chief opponent was the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), and the NAACP’s chief weapon in the fight against segregation tuition grants 
was the courtroom. 
 
Part 2. Shifting racial regimes: vouchers for liberals and race targeting 
The origins of Midwestern voucher programs 
In Mississippi, South Carolina, Alabama, Virginia and Louisiana lawsuits ended the segregation 
vouchers. Congress and the courts became more decisive in embedding civil rights in the decade 
between 1964 and 1973. As these laws and rulings took effect the blatant use of publicly-financed 
tuition-grant vouchers for white students to escape desegregation was finally defeated. By 1970, 
segregation tuition grants had been struck down as unconstitutional across the South,xvii though 
segregated institutions, including private segregated academies, remained (Carr 2012).  
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More broadly, segregation was legally displaced by the civil rights legislation in the 1960s 
enacted in response to the demands of the reform movement (Francis 2014; Young and Burstein 
1995). Legal and federally upheld segregation encountered decisive legislative defeat in the 1960s 
as Congress eventually passed laws against it in the mid-1960s. Combined with busing programs 
and new federal funding made available as a condition of desegregating schools, southern states 
made dramatic strides to integrate schools between 1968 and 1973 (D. King 2017; Clotfelter 
2004).  
Court orders were also crucial in ending vouchers as tools of segregated schools. In the 
north, the voucher cause experienced further set-backs during the 1970s. Segregation was mostly 
not de jure in the north but de facto present and resistance to school integration was fierce, and 
often violent, (Douglas 2005). 
A federal effort to institute a voucher program in New Hampshire foundered on local-level 
resistance in 1976 (Carl 2011). A public school voucher demonstration project lasted just five 
years in the Alum Rock district, California. Voter referenda quashed voucher plans by large 
majorities. Scattered tuition reimbursement programs in Illinois, Nebraska, New York, Ohio and 
Pennsylvania were struck down as unconstitutional between 1972 and 1974 on the grounds that 
they violated the separation of church and state. Unlike segregation tuition grants, these tuition 
reimbursement programs had incorporated the Catholic schools, which constituted a large section 
of all private schools then in existence.  
Despite support for the idea of vouchers amongst members of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity during the Great Society era, the Nixon and Reagan administrations, and even liberal 
academics such as Diane Ravitch and sociologist Christopher Jencks, no major voucher tuition 
programs were instituted during the 1970s and 1980s (Carl 2011; D. Ravitch 2001). This was an 
era in which the race-conscious policy alliance’s commitment to activist federal policy to advance 
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racial equality enjoyed national political support, even if voter resentment toward affirmative 
action and related measures was brewing (Frymer and Skrentny 1998). 
 
Voucher Designs as Race Targeting 
The reinvented place of vouchers in America’s racial hierarchies seemed to arrive in the early 
1990s when two major voucher programs passed. Each targeted large urban school systems. The 
trajectory of America’s racial hierarchies subsequently gave a new role to vouchers as part of a 
color-blind approach to policy. But first some advocates for racial equality were drawn to the 
potential efficacy of vouchers as a race-targeted instrument. These two phases of race-conscious 
controversies correspond to the expansion and subsequent retrenchment of minority political 
rights within the larger trajectory of racial politics in the United States (Jones 2017). 
Responding to a perceived crisis of city schools, high drop-out rates, low test scores and a 
growing urban African-American population still enduring segregation and discrimination, the 
Wisconsin and Ohio legislatures passed the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (1990) and the 
Cleveland Scholarship Program (1995) respectively. Amidst mounting disillusionment and an 
expanding racial achievement gap, Republican politicians saw a wedge issue on which they could 
ally with non-white Democrats.  
The racial dynamics of predominantly African-American cities within overwhelmingly 
white states, combined with anger at stalling desegregation, weak public school performance and 
growing black political power at municipal level generated sufficient support for change (Carl 
2011). Polls in the 1990s generally found African-American support for vouchers exceeds that of 
other racial groups (although responses vary with question-wording).xviii 
In 1990 Milwaukee and Cleveland were 30% and 47% African-American respectively 
compared to statewide populations that were 92% and 88% white (Table 4).  
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[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Population data in Table 4 underestimates the percentage of African-American enrolment in 
Milwaukee and Cleveland’s public schools because many white students had left the system for 
parochial schools over the preceding four decades.  
The Milwaukee program initially excluded religious schools but in 1995 the legislation was 
amended to include them. The program started to grow. From an initial enrollment of 258 students 
in the 1990-91 school year, the Milwaukee program swelled to 27,606 by 2016-17. In Ohio, the 
Cleveland program temporarily outstripped the Milwaukee program in enrollments but grew more 
modestly to 8,594 by 2017.  
As vouchers moved into a new phase during the 1990s, the separation between the state and 
the private schools became sharper than it had been even during the era of Jim Crow. Since the 
Wisconsin and Ohio vouchers allowed religious schools to participate (unlike the segregation 
vouchers) it was essential to disguise the connection between state and school by the intervention 
of private parental choice. Both Wisconsin and Ohio have state constitutional provisions known 
as ‘No-Aid Provisions’ that prohibit public funding of denominational institutions (Hackett 2014).  
To avoid running afoul of these constitutional provisions policymakers designed programs that 
funded parents rather than schools directly.  
In the Supreme Court’s 2002 Zelman v Simmons-Harris case this indirect program design 
acquired legal significance.xix The majority justices held that: ‘Our decisions have drawn a 
consistent distinction between government programs that provide aid directly to religious 
schools…and programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools 
only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals’ (Rehnquist 2002). 
Although 96% of recipients used the Cleveland voucher at religious schools, the Court found ‘no 
evidence that the State deliberately skewed incentives toward religious schools’ in the way that 
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the Jim Crow segregationists had skewed the administration of tuition grants toward segregated 
schools. In the most extreme case – Prince Edward County – there had simply been no non-
segregated in-county options for tuition grant recipients. 
Immediately challenged in court by plaintiffs acting for public school administrators, 
teacher unions and students, both voucher programs survived Supreme Court review and 
continued to expand. Figure 3 displays the expansion of voucher enrollments in these two 
programs as a proportion of the school-age population in each city (Source: US Census Bureau 
2010). A quarter of Milwaukee’s school-age population utilized a voucher in 2017. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Patterns of support for race targeted vouchers  
Wisconsin’s program is an important punctuation in the movement from conservative Democrat 
to overwhelmingly Republican patterns of voucher support. It rested on a ‘strange bedfellow’ 
alliance launched in the late 1980s by Wisconsin state representative Polly Williams. Williams, an 
African-American Democrat, sponsored the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program legislation 
allied with conservatives and the state’s Republican Governor, Tommy Thompson, to pass 
Wisconsin’s first voucher program in an effort to improve an urban school system wracked with 
weak results and growing poverty rates (Hess 2004). 
A native of Mississippi whose family had moved to Wisconsin prior to school integration, 
Williams’s advocacy of vouchers was unusual. Her colleague, former schools superintendent and 
founder of the pro-vouchers group Black Alliance for Educational Options (BAEO) Howard 
Fuller recalled in a 2014 interview: ‘In '88 being a black Democrat saying 'I support vouchers,' 
that was an unbelievably brave stand’ (Prothero 2014).  
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Williams proved to be an outlier from most supporters of activist policy for racial equality 
who campaigned for more spending on public schools in general, rather than selective voucher 
schemes. Although the use of vouchers as a mechanism for maintaining racial segregation did not 
appear explicitly in voucher discussions of the 1990s, the presence of race-conscious alliance 
members within the pro-voucher camp may have helped counter the impression that school choice 
was ‘a white, conservative movement that takes advantage of unwitting minority families’ (Reid 
2001b). 
Representative Williams’s work on behalf of the voucher cause was an instance in voucher 
history when the alignment of vouchers with the color-blind racial policy alliance broke down. 
While Republican conservatives never wavered in their support for vouchers – Governor 
Thompson had included a voucher proposal in his 1988 budget and Governor George Voinovich 
pushed Catholic Dioceses to join his voucher effort in Ohio (Voinovich 1991; Pilarczyk 1991, 
1993) – Representative Williams’s stance broke the race-conscious alliance’s opposition to 
vouchers and helped give birth to a new constellation of race-conscious groups seeking to boost 
vouchers for race-conscious ends. Launched in 2000, BAEO was the lynchpin of that race-
conscious pro-voucher alliance. They found some judicial support. 
 
Judicial patterns of support for vouchers  
Patterns of political support shifted during the era of race-conscious controversies, and these shifts 
were mirrored in changing patterns of support by judges in voucher cases. Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s courts often found voucher programs unconstitutional. But from the mid-1980s, and 
particularly since Zelman v Simmons-Harris in 2002 courts became more likely to uphold 
vouchers’ constitutionality, a vital legal prop for programs enduring fierce criticism from many 
race-conscious alliance members including the NAACP. This legal imprint complements the post-
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1970s Supreme Court majority’s dilution of affirmative action, set aside hiring and even voting 
rights (D. King and Smith 2016). 
In order to examine patterns of support for vouchers amongst judges, we collect and analyze 
information on all judicial opinions in voucher cases, 1955-2017, unearthing several empirical 
trends. First, Republican justices (and those appointed by Republican executives) have been 
consistently more sympathetic to vouchers than Democratic justices, mirroring Republican 
policymakers’ support for voucher bills. Second, Southern justices were more sympathetic to 
vouchers than western ones. And third justices have become more likely to uphold vouchers as 
constitutional over time, findings consistent with Hackett’s analysis of the broader universe of 
religious school aid programs (Hackett 2017b). This last trend extends the judicial patterns of the 
1960s.  
These findings show how during the transition of racial regime from segregation to the civil 
rights era, judicial decisions played a key role in facilitating the revival of vouchers despite their 
earlier rulings. This is part of America’s racial trajectory. It illustrates how racial hierarchies are 
reconfigured along new divisions between active racial equality reformers and those opposing the 
use of federal policies for equality, a dichotomy along the lines of King and Smith’s race-
conscious versus the color blind policy alliances. 
Our database contains 229 individual justice votes on voucher cases, including opinion 
writers, concurring decisions and dissents. This is the universe of cases. We subject our database 
to logistic regression with standard errors clustered by court to examine the effect of justice and 
state characteristics upon judges’ likelihood of voting in favor of vouchers (Table 5). The 
dependent variable is coded 1 if the justice voted to uphold a voucher as constitutional, 0 
otherwise. xx 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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Our regression shows that the patterns of support in courtrooms mirror patterns of support 
amongst policymakers, with Republicans most likely to vote in favor of vouchers even when 
controlling for sex, race and other variables. Compared to Southern judges we find that 
Westerners are less likely to uphold voucher programs as constitutional. Voucher bills have been 
held constitutional at a much faster rate in recent years, as the statistically significant result for the 
date of program challenge indicates. Republican-appointed judges are more likely to uphold 
voucher programs than Democratic-appointed judges. 
The key difference between legislative and judicial realms before the breakdown of Jim 
Crow is that Democratic justices struck down policies passed by Democratic majorities. This split 
reflects the division between the Democratic Party’s northern and southern wings during that 
racial epoch. Most baldly, Democratic federal court judges confronted measures passed by 
racially-conservative Democratic majorities in southern legislatures.  
The clash between segregationist and anti-segregationist racial policy alliances is amply 
illustrated in decisions such as Harrison v Day (1959), Hall v St Helena Parish School Board 
(1961), and Lee v Macon County Board of Education (1964), which found Virginian, Louisianan 
and Alabaman tuition grant programs, respectively, unconstitutional (Eggleston 1959; Wisdom 
1961; Rives, Grooms, and Johnson 1964).  
Since the Jim Crow era, as partisan distinctions between race-conscious and color-blind 
alliances have inflamed, the Republican Party has continued to move toward racial conservatism 
and the Democratic Party broadened its racial liberalism (Feinstein and Schickler 2008; Schickler 
2016). Republican justices remain more sympathetic to voucher programs than Democratic 
justices but they now mostly confront Republican rather than Democratic legislation. During the 
era of race-conscious controversies from the 1980s onwards, judges became more supportive of 
voucher programs. 
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The switch from ‘freedom of choice’ to racial equality frames (and back again)  
Although the Cleveland voucher program was held constitutional in the US Supreme Court case, 
Zelman v Simmons-Harris in 2002,  voucher bills grew at an indifferent rate during the following 
decade (Carl 2011; Forman 2007). Enrollments in the Milwaukee and Cleveland programs 
continued to rise (Figure 3) but surprisingly few voucher bills were introduced in other state 
legislatures or passed by referenda. During George W. Bush’s time in office just eleven voucher 
programs were created at state level and a federally-funded voucher program inaugurated for 
Washington D.C. Several were struck down in court on First Amendment grounds, including 
programs in Colorado and Florida (see Figure 1). This period of sluggish growth extended to the 
2000s. 
James Forman concluded in 2007 that school vouchers failed to expand after Zelman 
because the sorts of arguments mustered in favor of vouchers did not resonate among the 
constituencies whose support they needed. In Forman’s formulation, early advocates framed their 
pro-voucher arguments as a ‘values claim’. Vouchers protected the right of parents to send their 
child to a school that reinforced their values. This framing rallied Christian conservatives to the 
voucher cause between the 1970s and the 1990s. It was also a core element of southern 
segregationists’ ‘freedom of association’ framing during the 1950s and 1960s, a color-blind 
facade to conceal their racist purposes. 
Beginning in the 1990s, Forman argues that supporters of vouchers switched from the 
‘values claim’ to a ‘racial justice claim’ that emphasized the right of low-income and minority 
parents to send their children to academically rigorous private schools. The Wisconsin program 
fits this characterization. Representative Williams criticized public school desegregation plans for 
making black children ‘get up at 5 a.m., standing out in the dark and cold, so they can be bused to 
some faraway place where no one teaches them anything. [The white establishment] controls 
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everything. White bus companies, white businesses, white suburbs…they get millions upon 
millions on account of Chapter 220 [the then 25-year-old desegregation plan]’ (Ruenzel 1995).  
Forman concludes that, ‘the racial-justice claim asserted that vouchers provided educational 
emancipation for poor students, mostly black, trapped in dysfunctional urban districts’ (Forman 
2007, 551). A switch in the ‘public face, intellectual rationale, and legal defense’ of the voucher 
movement toward explicitly race-conscious arguments made the legal defense of the Cleveland 
voucher program easier, although it failed to resonate with white constituencies.  
The new focus on helping minorities, rather than First Amendment issues, appealed to a 
majority of the Supreme Court. In his concurring opinion in Zelman, Justice Clarence Thomas 
wrote: ‘the failure to provide education to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of 
poverty, dependence, criminality, and alienation that continues for the remainder of their lives.’ 
He declaimed: ‘If society cannot end racial discrimination, at least it can arm minorities with the 
education to defend themselves from some of discrimination's effects’ (Zelman v Simmons-Harris 
2002). 
In the 1962 reprint of his essay on The Role of Government in Education Milton Friedman 
removed the footnote which had positively identified the southern programs designed to 
circumvent de-segregation after the Brown ruling as leading examples of vouchers (Friedman 
1955; Chubb and Moe 1990; Carl 2011). Friedman could obviously scent the political times and 
the racial equality tilt in national politics. His caution was shared widely by voucher advocates. 
When vouchers re-emerged as a major force in the 1990s, proponents now advanced a different 
set of rationales based on race-consciousness and targeting rather than the defense of racial 
inequality.  
Members of the pro-voucher coalition advanced the framing of school vouchers as ‘the civil 
rights issue of our time’ (Snow 2016). It was a deliberate strategy on the part of voucher 
supporters and their legal team in the Zelman decision, headed by Clint Bolick, co-founder of the 
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pro-voucher organization Institute for Justice (Minow 2010). Their aim was to expand the base of 
support for vouchers and to help shore up its legal defense by claiming the mantle of the civil 
rights struggle in education (Persson 2015). Dr Martin Luther King Jr’s niece Alveda King 
endorsed school choice as a civil right in a Wall Street Journal op-ed (A. C. King 1997). 
Pennsylvanian Governor Tom Corbett echoed Louisianan Governor Bobby Jindal, also 
Republican, in calling vouchers ‘the civil rights issue of the twenty-first century’ (Infield 2010).  
One signal of the extent to which vouchers had been re-imagined since their origins as 
instruments of segregation came in 2011, when the Pennsylvanian Democrat State Senator (and 
African-American) Anthony H. Williams compared opponents of vouchers to segregationists: 
‘Standing in the way of school choice for needy kids in failing urban schools is like Gov. George 
Wallace standing in the doorway of a classroom to continue the segregation of the '60s’ (Worden 
and Hardy 2011). Historian Martha Minow concludes that, ‘Clint Bolick’s strategy…paid off. 
Identifying poor black and Hispanic children as beneficiaries and aligning school choice with civil 
rights rather than against it seemed to work…Public attitudes about school choice depended in no 
small part on the framing of the issue’ (Minow 2010, 122).  
Yet despite these efforts to claim the mantle of the civil rights movement, voucher growth 
was tepid into the first decade of the twenty-first century. Forman argues that such race-conscious 
claims repelled white conservatives. The true voucher renaissance was still to come, nourished by 
the ascendance of the increasingly confident color-blind alliance. 
 
Part 3. Vouchers in the civil rights era: the color-blind resurgence 
Modern voucher growth and racial spillover in the Obama era 
The real push for vouchers by state legislatures came mid-way through Barack Obama’s first term 
as newly-elected Republican legislatures started to exploit the Zelman clearance. This new thrust 
was a direct response to the heightened racial polarization of Obama’s presidency and not 
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confined to education policy. It was abetted by a shift in governance toward Republican control of 
state government after 2010 in legislatures across the country. Newly unified Republican 
governments in Indiana, Wisconsin, Alabama, Pennsylvania, North Carolina and New Hampshire 
all passed voucher bills in the two years following the 2010 elections. 
 Just as his health care reform divided voters by race, so the Obama presidency galvanized 
opponents of racial equality to use vouchers as a means to keep education segregated (D. King 
and Smith 2014; Frankenberg and Siegel-Hawley 2010; Hackett 2017a). The striking rise of 
vouchers is not causally explained by America’s increasing racial polarization but the correlation 
is hardly racially neutral. Tesler explains a similar contagion as racial spillover (Tesler 2012). In 
the era of an African-American president, public policies notably health care and gun control 
regulation become racialized in that voters view these issues through the prism of their racial 
policy preferences. Racial spillover spread into vouchers (Samson 2012; Tesler 2016). 
The use of race-conscious frames may have aided the legal defense of vouchers, but the 
literature on racialization demonstrates that the general public is negatively disposed to race-
conscious measures aimed at aiding blacks (Tesler 2016; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; 
Gilens 1996). Using ‘racial justice’ claims weakened the voucher cause by focusing on school 
underperformance. This emphasis opened the door for greater regulation of private schooling and 
alienated white conservative Christians, thus dooming the voucher cause as former supporters 
deserted it (Forman 2007). But other support was at hand. When vouchers were rediscovered 
again by Republican state legislatures after 2010, color-blind frames were ascendant nationally 
even though these advocates felt the need to gesture toward potential race targeted gains from 
vouchers.  
Two thousand and eleven has been declared ‘the year of school choice.’ It was merely a 
starting-gun. Seven programs were created in 2011 alone, six in 2012, nine in 2013, and twelve 
more by the end of 2016. Design varied. Some utilized tax credits and intermediary organizations 
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for the distribution of grants. Other programs took an individualized savings account model, but 
all subsidized parents’ choice of private school tuition. 
Southern legislatures embraced vouchers enthusiastically. Mississippi and Virginia passed 
their first modern voucher programs in 2012; Alabama and both Carolinas in 2013. By 2016 all 
seven of the original segregation tuition grant states had passed new voucher bills. Indeed, 
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina each had more than one such 
program. These were impeccably color-blind initiatives. 
In this modern period, voucher programs stretched from Montana to Maryland and from 
New Hampshire to Nevada. Western states were generally less receptive to vouchers although 
states such as Arizona and Nevada embraced them. Enrollments grew to more than half a million 
children nationwide across thirty states. In 2015, by our estimate, 665,760 students used some 
form of voucher. Figure 4 displays the growth of enrollments in voucher programs as a proportion 
of the school age population in selected states (Sources: Edchoice.org; US Census 1990; 2000; 
2010). 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As Figure 4 shows, vouchers serve around 6-7% of the school-age population in school 
choice hotspots Indiana and Wisconsin, three times as many, proportionately, as were served by 
tuition grants in the Deep South after Brown.  
The take-up of modern voucher programs varies depending upon the characteristics of the 
program and the state. By 2018 we calculate that there were eighteen programs targeted at 
disabled students (most in the South), sixteen programs targeted at low-income groups (most in 
the Midwest), two programs for students in failing schools, twelve programs with multiple 
eligibility requirements and twelve universal programs with no eligibility limits (EdChoice 
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2018).xxi Compensatory programs (those with income limits for participation) and those targeted 
at cities tend to attract a greater proportion of black participants. ‘Universal’ programs such as 
those enacted by Indiana place no income or geographical limits on voucher participation and so 
tend to be dominated by whites, mirroring the disproportionate take-up of public tuition grant 
funds during the era of segregation (Brunner, Imazeki, and Ross 2006; Potter 2017; Carl 2011, 2).  
Some states conspicuously failed to pass such programs, however.  None of the three most 
populous states (California, Texas and New York) had passed vouchers by 2017. New York and 
California were bastions of the liberal, increasingly Democratic race-conscious alliance so their 
absence is unremarkable. In Texas at least six legislative efforts to enact vouchers failed in 
committee or on the floor, defeated by a strange-bedfellow state-based coalition of Democrats, 
rural Republicans fearing the loss of public school provision, and homeschoolers and Baptist 
groups fearful of governmental intrusion into religion, which has (so far) repelled federal pro-
voucher organizations by campaigning for a distinctively Texan approach (Garrett 2017).xxii  
 
Racial alliances and patterns of support for vouchers  
The race-conscious alliance’s opposition to vouchers looked precarious during the 1990s. But the 
mainstream civil rights organizations mobilized and prevailed. The NAACP and its local chapters 
organized vigorous opposition to vouchers. Aside from BAEO the number of race-conscious 
proponents of vouchers remained small, with a mere handful of state- and locally-based groups, 
such as Hispanics for School Choice, a Wisconsin grouping, and Black Clergy of Philadelphia, 
mobilizing on behalf of school vouchers during the most recent push for vouchers starting in 2011 
(Rodriguez 2011; Bunch 2011). BAEO disbanded in 2017. 
Well over ninety percent of voucher bills passed since Representative Williams’s efforts in 
Wisconsin were created by color-blind alliance members and opposed by race-conscious alliance 
members. Between 1990 and 2017, seven programs passed Democratic-controlled legislatures, 
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including in states such as Louisiana and Maryland with large African-American populations, but 
they were dwarfed by the forty-eight programs that passed under unified Republican control.  
To examine patterns of voucher bill support we collate an original dataset of all state 
legislative votes on the forty-seven voucher bills passed in the twelve years to 2017.xxiii Our 
dataset contains the universe of state legislators who voted on those bills in 6,693 votes plus 
twelve voucher bills that were brought to a vote before July 2017 but failed to become law 
because they were vetoed or voted down, yielding a total of 7,851 state legislator votes. We 
subject our data to multilevel logistic regression in order to identify those factors that affect 
policymaker support for vouchers, modelling state legislators’ votes in terms of their individual 
and district-level characteristics (partisan affiliation, race and sex; district ideology, private school 
enrollment, racial district characteristics and government employees) and state level 
characteristics (educational expenditure, unionization rates and previous legal challenges).  
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Our findings in the main effects model (Table 6) underline the extent to which race-
conscious and color-blind patterns of support have become polarized. As expected Republicans 
are much more likely to vote for a voucher bill than Democrats but there is a statistically 
significant interaction with their state legislative district ideology, displayed in the interactive 
model in Table 6.  
To pinpoint state legislative district ideology we utilize the American Ideology Project 
(2015) MRP scores on district ideology after the 2010 census redistricting (Tausanovitch and 
Warshaw 2013).xxiv The more conservative their district, the more Democratic legislators are 
likely to vote in favor of vouchers. The effect is substantial and asymmetrical. A Republican state 
legislator has around an 85% chance of voting in favor of a voucher bill regardless of his or her 
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district’s ideology. By contrast a Democratic state legislator with the most conservative district is 
more than twice as likely (42%) to vote in favor of a voucher bill than a Democratic legislator 
with the most liberal district (18%), as Figure 5 shows.  
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
But Figure 5 finds that even a Democrat representing a conservative district still has a much 
smaller chance of voting in favor of vouchers than a Republican. Color-blind alliance members – 
Republicans and conservatives – overwhelmingly predominate amongst voucher supporters. 
Greater rates of unionization also have a statistically significant negative effect upon legislators’ 
chances of voting for vouchers. This finding underlines the teacher union presence as part of the 
Democratic coalition and race-conscious voucher opposition movements (D. King and Smith 
2011), and union concern about vouchers’ potential to damage public schools (Dorfman 2016). 
We have already noted how racial and ideological polarization has intensified in the last 
decade and a half (Barber and McCarty 2016; Tesler 2016), a trend reflected in the results. This 
growing polarization between the racial policy alliances means that voucher support aligns along 
partisan lines more sharply than during the era of Jim Crow, when Democratic judges struck 
down Democratic voucher legislation. Formerly enthusiastic liberal supporters of vouchers, such 
as Diane Ravitch, began to turn against the voucher cause after 2010 (D. Ravitch 2013). They 
have become some of vouchers’ fiercest critics.  
The color-blind alliance on school vouchers is complicated by the characteristics of 
legislators’ districts. White legislators (and males) are statistically significantly more likely to 
vote in favor of vouchers than non-white legislators and females. But our data shows that the 
proportion of African-Americans in a legislator’s district is positively related to a vote in favor of 
vouchers (Table 6). Despite the opposition of most civil rights organizations and the dominance of 
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conservative organizations such as the American Federation for Children, Cato Institute, Institute 
for Justice and Goldwater Institute within the pro-voucher movement, the main effects model 
shows that legislators with the highest proportion of African-Americans in their districts are 
fifteen percentage points more likely to vote in favor of vouchers (77% chance) than legislators 
with the highest proportion of whites (62% chance).  
This striking datum recalls the patterns of support for tuition grant legislation in the Jim 
Crow South. Legislators with the whitest districts were, and still are, the least enthusiastic about 
the voucher cause.  
One explanation for white districts’ relative reluctance is Forman’s argument that racial 
justice claims for vouchers fail to resonate with core white voucher constituencies (Forman 2007). 
Another possibility is that, despite their color-blind presentation, the race-conscious reimagining 
of vouchers during the first decade of the civil rights era activates feelings of racial threat amongst 
whites (Bobo 1998; Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Tesler 2012).  
We cannot distinguish these two explanations here but note the interaction between a 
legislator’s party and his/her district racial characteristics. Republican legislators representing 
districts with a larger proportion of African-American voters are less likely to support voucher 
legislation than Republicans representing whiter districts; Democratic legislators representing 
districts with a larger proportion of African-American voters are more likely to support vouchers 
than Democrats in whiter districts (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 suggests that at least some Democratic legislators perceive demand for vouchers from 
black constituents – an inference we cannot make firmly on the basis of this data – but the elite 
politics of vouchers remains resolutely framed by the race-conscious/color-blind distinction. 
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Nonwhite legislators and Democrats are significantly less likely to support vouchers than white 
legislators and Republicans. The racial dimensions of vouchers tend to remain implicit in the 
contemporary racial order and buried beneath color-blind frames, to which we now turn. 
 
Back to ‘freedom of choice’ frames 
Modern arguments for school vouchers tend to be color-blind, at least on the surface. Legislators 
argue in favor of vouchers for poor children, implying that racial minorities are the target 
population without emphasizing race directly (O’Brien 1996; Gooden, Jabbar, and Mario S. 
Torres 2016). Gooden and colleagues find: ‘Contemporary case law, state statutes, and politicians 
who are proponents of vouchers have tended to adopt a race-neutral approach to using vouchers to 
address equity. This does not, however, mean that race is not a part of this debate’ (Gooden, 
Jabbar, and Mario S. Torres 2016, 523). In the context of America’s modern racial hierarchies and 
post-2008 intensified racial and ideological polarization, color-blind claims for vouchers may be 
promoted as impartial but few voters or law makers can fail to grasp their racial implications.  
Drawing upon a sample of 526 broadsheet newspaper articles drawn from Factiva for the 
twelve states that passed voucher programs in 2011 and 2012, the first years of the most recent 
voucher expansions, we find color-blind rationales overshadow race-conscious ones. A full 
description of method and coding procedures is available in the endnotes.xxv Seven of these twelve 
states had no reporting of explicit racial claims for or against vouchers at all. In the remaining 
five, claims for vouchers as a remedy for racial inequality were infrequent compared to choice, 
quality and efficiency arguments.  
In all states color-blind framings predominated, focusing on individual parents rather than 
racial groups and eschewing racial language.  The most common arguments cited in favor of 
vouchers were that they save money, improve educational quality and increase access to 
educational opportunity for students and choice for parents. The most common arguments against 
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vouchers were that they drain money from the public school system, defy the legislature’s 
obligation to provide a good, uniform system of public education and violate the separation of 
church and state by providing funds to religious schools. Explicitly race-conscious arguments that 
vouchers would address racial inequality were rare. Vouchers are framed in color-blind ways. 
 
The rise of color-blind policy design  
The rise of the color-blind racial policy alliance is associated not only with color-blind patterns of 
support and rhetorical frames but also with color-blind policy designs. A race-conscious policy 
design utilizes explicit racial categories to confront racial inequalities directly through 
government action (what Justice Sonia Sotomayor calls ‘race targeting’ measures), whereas color-
blind policy designs favor a market-driven ‘free choice’ approach by individual consumers. 
President Obama’s Department of Justice fought some modern voucher programs in the South on 
the grounds that the programs have the potential to undermine existing court-ordered 
desegregation plans by enabling parents to opt out for private schools (Walsh 2013). 
Modern, ‘universal’ voucher programs – such as the tax credit vouchers in Arizona and 
Georgia – place no income limits on student eligibility and in some cases, no requirement to have 
spent time in the public school before taking up a voucher. Race-conscious policy alliance 
members argue that targeting is required to ensure that children of color benefit and that public 
money is not distributed to economically advantaged households, who would have sent their 
children to private school regardless. When Representative Polly Williams and former Milwaukee 
superintendent Howard Fuller championed vouchers in 2010 they argued that the programs should 
not be extended to higher income groups but instead should focus only on low-income minorities, 
a further cooling in race-conscious support for the new vouchers and the surge of color-blindness 
(Marley 2013; Marley and Stein 2011; Bice 2013). By 2018 BAEO had dissolved.  
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The rise of the color-blind policy design tends to obscure the state’s role in the provision of 
a social benefit by directing funds through private third party organizations or through the tax 
system (Mettler 2009). Voucher policy designs became more ‘submerged’, utilizing private 
organizations or the tax system to deliver benefits. By funding parents rather than schools directly 
and utilizing tax credits and ‘educational savings accounts’, modern voucher programs 
individualize social policy decisions and obscure the relationship between state action and the 
confrontation of racial inequalities that is the hallmark of race-conscious policymaking.  
The fight between advocates of compensatory vouchers and those who favor ‘universal’ 
vouchers mirrors the clash between race-conscious and color-blind forces. It has been sharpened 
by the recent finding that color-blind voucher statutes provide insufficient protection against 
racial discrimination in private school admissions (Eckes, Mead, and Ulm 2016). In May 2017, 
under questioning from House appropriations committee members, US Secretary of Education 
Betsy DeVos declined to say if the federal government would step in to prevent voucher-receiving 
private schools from  discriminating against students (Resmovits 2017). DeVos argued that 
decisions should be left to parents, an approach to voucher politics that is quintessentially color-
blind in its elevation of individual choice over direct and purposeful state action. 
Reducing the traceability of the connection between government and policy administration 
is a characteristic of color-blind policymaking. Individuals make choices in private markets that 
are officially color-blind and the state is merely a neutral umpire. This submerged form of 
governance is the opposite of race-conscious policymaking which involves direct state action to 
remedy racial disadvantage.  
The Trump administration’s FY2018 budget includes federal grant money to pay for 
school vouchers, delivering money indirectly, but faces opposition from Democrats and rural 
Republicans. A Department of Education spokesperson stated: ‘To be clear, there is no federal 
voucher program. The [private school voucher] grant program would support states who apply for 
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funding to develop school choice programs, and those States' plans must adhere to Federal law’ 
(Ujifusa 2017). This color-blind arms-length form of governance is increasingly characteristic of 
voucher politics. 
 
Conclusion  
Are vouchers truly color-blind or race-conscious? We have argued the answer depends upon the 
historical context of America’s racial hierarchies under examination. We have employed and 
refined the racial orders theoretical framework to account for the trajectory of vouchers since their 
origin in the 1950s. 
Although the voucher schemes differ across the three epochs there are significant 
resonances because of the way in which public policy is shaped by America’s racial orders. One 
such parallel between Jim Crow era tuition grants and modern vouchers is that, when allowed to 
do so, parents who already send their children to private schools will tend to consume vouchers to 
a greater extent than parents whose children are in public schools. For example, 86% of Georgian 
tuition grant recipients in 1962 had already been enrolled in private schools before the fight over 
desegregation (Kruse 2005, 171). Thus grants tended to benefit those, principally whites, who 
already had the means to fund private education.  
We argue that to understand the voucher renaissance observable since 2008, these measures 
must be located historically in America’s racial hierarchies. This approach reveals how vouchers 
were directed toward white supremacist ends, briefly harnessed by the race-conscious alliance, 
and are now part of the conservative ideology of color-blindness that has surged since the Reagan 
era, bursting into the presidential election in 2016. This historical legacy illustrates the non-linear 
trajectory of vouchers in America’s shifting racial orders.  
This trajectory is more than the ‘layering’ of new policies onto existing schemes, one form 
of American political development scholars identify. It qualifies the process of ‘displacement’ 
38 
 
described by Skowronek and Orren of which the ‘overthrow of Jim Crow was a major’ instance 
(Skowronek and Orren 2016, 29). Yes, Jim Crow was displaced in national institutions, laws, 
norms and routines, but unremarkably the resilience of racial orders ensures that the contemporary 
voucher programs echoes the racial hierarchies prompting their origin. 
We identify multiple concurrent and consecutive transformations in voucher politics over 
time in three arenas of racial policy alliance conflict: multiplication of color-blind policy designs, 
growing legal and political support from a conservative alliance, and a smorgasbord of voucher 
rationales rooted in color-blind framing. Vouchers have never been racially neutral, but have 
served key roles with respect to the evolving racial politics of the post-Brown era. By examining 
the roles vouchers have played in the making and unmaking of racial hierarchies over time, we 
deflate the myth of their racial neutrality and show their contribution to the rise of color-blind 
ideology in national US politics.  
 
 
i We use the term ‘voucher’ to refer to all types of program that offer a sum of public money to parents to spend on their 
child’s education at a private school of their choice, whether they are ‘tax credit scholarship’ vouchers, ‘tuition grants’, 
or ‘educational savings accounts’.  
ii Other commentators are beginning to acknowledge the racist origins of school vouchers (Ford, Johnson, and Partelow 
2017) 
iii Some black children also received tuition grant vouchers, which could be used only in segregated black schools. 
iv Of course the division between these periods of racial orders is a heuristic device and there is no absolute movement 
across the dates. 
v Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
vi Segregation tuition grants were not the first forms of school choice but they were the first programs of any scale that 
offered grants to parents to exercise their ‘freedom of choice’ of a private school. Scattered programs enacted after the 
first and second world wars had paid for tuition for the children of returning servicemen. Town tuitioning programs in 
rural areas of Maine and Vermont, established in the late nineteenth century and still in operation, pay for public or non-
religious private school for students from towns without a public school, but fewer than 5% of students in each state are 
eligible for these programs and tuition is paid directly to the receiving school rather than to parents. 
vii Grants were not distributed until 1961 
viii Grants were not distributed until 1962 
ix After being struck down as unconstitutional, the program was repackaged by state legislators in 1959 
x Poindexter v Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission, 275 F.Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1968) 
xi Coffey v State Educational Finance Commission, 296 F.Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969) 
xii There are slight differences between different sources in reports of the exact number of vouchers issued for the years 
1959, 1961 and 1964, but in each case the number is small. We have taken the source that cites an issuance figure 
alongside a more exact financial outlay (for example, ‘$1,034,392’ as opposed to ‘over $1m’) as the more reliable. There 
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are no precise figures for 1968 and 1969. Contemporaneous news sources tell us only that ‘nearly 14,000’ vouchers were 
issued in Virginia in 1967 and ‘more than 13,000’ in 1968.  
xiii Borden v Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005 (1928) 
xiv There are a handful of instances of parents utilizing state-funded tuition grants to send their children to integrated 
schools. 
xv Griffin v County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) 
xvi Hall v St Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961) 
xvii  The relevant cases are Harrison v Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959); Hall v St Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. 
Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961); Pettaway v County School Board of Surry County, Va. (230 F.Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1964); 
Griffin v County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Lee v Macon County Board of 
Education, 231 F.Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964); Poindexter v Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission, 275 F.Supp. 
833 (E.D. La. 1968); South Carolina Board of Education v Brown, 393 U.S. 222 (1968); Coffey v State Educational 
Finance Commission, 296 F.Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969) 
xviii Polls during this period generally showed that African-Americans were more supportive of vouchers than other racial 
groups: 76% support in a 1992 National Catholic Education Association poll; 62% support in a 1997 Phi Delta 
Kappa/Gallup poll (compared to 47% amongst white respondents); 57.3% support in a 1997 Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies poll (compared to an evenly divided white response) (Lawton 1992; Coles 1997; Hill 1998). However, 
exit polls in California and Michigan voucher ballot initiatives showed no difference or lower support for vouchers 
amongst blacks than amongst whites, and other nationwide polls displayed greater skepticism of vouchers by African-
Americans: for example, 41% of African-Americans “strongly oppose” vouchers in a 2001 Zogby International poll 
compared to 32% in the whole sample (Reid 2001a; Leal 2004). Voucher opinions are highly sensitive to question 
wording.  
xix Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) 
xx There are no statistically significant effects for a justice’s race or sex likely due to the small proportion of justices that 
are either non-white (5% of cases) or female (14% of cases) 
xxi We exclude the “town tuitioning” programs in New Hampshire, Maine and Vermont from this count, because these 
nineteenth-century programs apply only to districts that lack an existing public school. 
xxii Opposition to vouchers in Texas comes from an alliance of Democrats and Republican lawmakers with rural and 
suburban constituencies. For example in the 2017 votes on SB1, a failed voucher bill, 62% of Republican lawmakers 
from less urbanized districts (those with an urbanized population of less than 80% according to the U.S. Census Bureau) 
voted against vouchers while 67% of Republican lawmakers from more urbanized districts (greater than 80% 
urbanization) voted in favor. In short, Texan Republicans from less urban districts helped scupper voucher bills alongside 
Democrats. This opposition may be related to practical questions about the viability of school choice in less-populated 
areas and concern about loss of public school jobs as much as fears of government regulation of private religious schools 
or perceptions of racial threat to white suburban school districts. 
xxiii We exclude the Colorado Douglas County school board voucher pilot, launched in 2011 as it is the only program 
created at the local school district level. All other programs were passed by state legislatures. 
xxiv MRP scores estimate the mean ideology of each state legislative district. They are based on the 2008-2014 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). For more information on the methodology used to estimate district 
ideology scores, see Tausonovitch and Warshaw (2013) and http://americanideologyproject.com/ 
xxv Newspaper Coding Procedures: Analyzing Factiva for newspapers with thirteen programs in the twelve states in 
which voucher scholarships were passed during either 2011 or 2012, we create an original database of 526 broadsheet 
newspaper articles. Articles are drawn from 65 state newspapers and 9 additional online news sources in these 13 states. 
Identification and coding involves all named actors and groups that took a stance on vouchers expressed by: lobbying, 
attacking, defending, or ruling for or against the scholarships in court, sponsoring legislation or voting for or against the 
scholarships in the legislature, vetoing or signing a scholarship bill, articulating an editorial opinion, releasing a press 
statement, or otherwise making a public declaration in favor of or in opposition to scholarships. A total of 835 separate 
actors are individually identified and logged in our database. Newspapers in more than half of the case study states had 
no reporting of explicit racial claims for or against vouchers at all.  
On at least three separate occasions during this period, explicit race-conscious arguments made by elites for and against 
vouchers attracted such criticism that they needed to be re-articulated in color-blind terms: (1) the allegations made by 
both proponents and opponents of the expansion of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program that the other side is racist 
(Marley 2013; Marley and Stein 2011); (2) re-articulation of voucher support in color-blind terms in North Carolina 
(Bonner 2011; Ashley 2014; J. Ravitch 2014; Childress 2013).; (3) remarks about African-American families by the 
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Racine Unified School District superintendent about the Milwaukee voucher program that surfaced during the 2013 
debates about vouchers (Tenbrink 2013). 
Addressing bias: We address the dangers of bias rising from newspaper selection and coding procedures through 
comprehensive searches and transparent coding methods (Franzosi 1987). We examine all state newspapers in the 
Factiva database for each of the twelve case study states, searching in each case for the terms “education voucher/tax 
credit scholarship, separately and in conjunction with the name of the relevant bill and the bill number. Our analysis 
includes all state newspaper articles mentioning the relevant piece of legislation, however briefly: its formulation, 
passage, implementation, effects and, in some cases, litigation. Certain newspapers may have chosen to cover education 
vouchers more frequently than other sources, and these editorial choices may be related systematically to ideological 
stance, support for vouchers or other relevant variables. Indeed, we expect this to be the case. Given that we are 
concerned with how the media typically frames voucher arguments, any systematic biases of these kinds do not 
invalidate inference. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Three arenas of racial policy alliance contestation: framing, design, support 
 Color-blind Race-conscious 
In King and Smith  
(italics added) 
Framing 
and 
rhetoric 
No mention of race in 
policy wording, discussion 
points or amongst elites 
during bill passage. 
Example: Disavowal of 
racial categories in GOP 
party platform 
Legislation mentions race, 
or policy is framed in 
racial terms during bill 
passage. 
Example: Direct 
acknowledgment of racial 
groups in Democratic 
party platform 
‘This framing of racial 
issues has produced a 
polarized politics of 
disputatious mutual 
disrespect…’ (D. King and 
Smith 2011, 12) 
 
‘…the party has professed 
commitments to color-
blind policy approaches…’ 
(D. King and Smith 2011, 
10) 
Policy 
design and 
targets 
Policy does not target 
particular racial groups; 
individual based market-
oriented mechanisms. 
Example: Tax 
expenditures 
Direct state action to 
ameliorate racial 
inequalities; policy targets 
particular racial categories. 
Example: Affirmative 
action programs 
‘Proponents of both color-
blind and race-conscious 
policies have drawn the 
wrong lesson from this 
history.’ (D. King and 
Smith 2011, 11) 
 
‘Measures…designed and 
implemented with specific 
goals of racial equality in 
view’ (D. King and Smith 
2011, 9) 
Patterns of 
support 
Support drawn from 
conservatives and 
Republicans: color-blind 
alliance. 
Support drawn from 
liberals and Democrats: 
race-conscious alliance. 
‘Race-conscious 
proponents’ and ‘color-
blind advocates’ 
 
The ‘clash of rival “color-
blind” and “race-
conscious” racial policy 
alliances’ (D. King and 
Smith 2011, 9) 
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Table 2: Three Eras of Voucher Politics 
Era 
Jim Crow and the 
aftermath of 
Brown (1950-
1964) 
Era of Transition 
(1964-96) 
The Civil Rights Era 
and Rise of Color Blind 
Vouchers 
(1996 - ) 
Patterns 
of 
support 
White supremacists 
Scattered liberal support; 
race-conscious 
opposition and strange 
bedfellow alliances 
Color-blind alliance 
Framing 
and 
rhetoric  
Veneer of color-
blindness: 
‘freedom of 
association’ 
Liberal vs segregationist 
versions; some race-
conscious arguments 
Smorgasbord of 
arguments, but 
dominated by color-
blind frames 
Design 
and 
targets 
Quasi-direct 
transfers of public 
funds; 
decentralized 
administration; 
targeted at whites 
Mixture of tuition aid 
and in-kind aid 
programs; some indirect 
transfer of voucher funds 
via parents; some race 
targeting 
Increasingly indirect 
transfers; tax credit 
funding; target 
dependent upon program 
design 
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Table 3: Vouchers in the Era of Segregation. 
Four 
approaches 
Characteristics States 
Massive 
resistance 
Early adopters of tuition grants alongside an 
all-out assault on the Brown ruling: school 
closures, abolition of compulsory attendance, 
interposition etc. 
Virginia, Louisiana, 
Georgia, Alabama 
Safety valve 
Adoption but no actual distribution of public 
tuition grants. An effort to strike a balance 
between placating segregationists and 
avoiding legal challenge 
North Carolina, 
Arkansas 
Resignation 
No tuition grant legislation. Slow and 
unenthusiastic but steady progress towards 
desegregating the public schools 
Maryland, West 
Virginia, Kentucky, 
Tennessee 
Violent 
suppression 
Tuition grant legislation not needed at first 
because fear of violent reprisals stifles the 
prospect of legal challenge. Much later 
adopters of tuition grants, after barriers to 
desegregation finally start to fall 
Mississippi, South 
Carolina 
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Table 4: Racial characteristics of Milwaukee and Cleveland’s populations, 1990 
 White African-American Other Total 
Milwaukee 398,033 (63%) 191,255 (30%) 38,800 (6%) 628,088 
Wisconsin* 4,512,523 (92%) 244,539 (5%) 134,707 (3%) 4,891,769 
Cleveland 250,234 (49%) 235,405 (47%) 19,977 (4%) 505,616 
Ohio* 9,521,756 (88%) 1,154,826 (11%) 170,533 (2%) 10,847,115 
*State as a whole. Source: U.S. Census 1990 
 
  
 
Table 5:  Judicial decisions in voucher cases, 1955-2017. Logistic regression with standard errors clustered by court 
Partisan 
affiliation (R = 1) 
1.268*** 
(.366) 
1.335*** 
(.351) 
1.329*** 
(.355) 
1.209*** 
(.338) 
1.217*** 
(.337) 
1.213*** 
(.339) 
Sex (Male = 1)  -.562 (.351) -.579 (.367) .394 (.300) .394 (.301) .375 (.373) 
Race (White = 1)   .204 (.507) .709 (.498) .715 (.498) .800 (.526) 
Date of challenge    .061*** (.010) .060*** (.010) .080***(.014) 
No Aid Provision     .033 (.091) .080 (.096) 
Region        North      .543 (.871) 
               Midwest      1.217*** 
(.459) 
                    West      -.867** (.509) 
Constant -1.248*** 
(.325) 
-.807* (.477) -.982** (.484) -123.751*** 
(20.588) 
 
-121.969*** 
(20.212) 
-163.144*** 
(28.729) 
N = 231; Pseudo R² = .280; ; p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.1* 
 Table 6: State legislator votes on successful and unsuccessful voucher bill votes held 
2005-2017. Multilevel logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by 
state 
Individual and district level variables 
 Main effects model Interactive model 
Partisan affiliation (Republican = 1) 4.782*** (.232) 5.553*** (.273) 
District ideology .735*** (.278) 1.468*** (.350) 
Partisan affiliation*district ideology  -1.027*** (.466) 
% Government employees in district -3.267** (1.260) -2.760** (1.230) 
Legislator race (Black = 1) -.398* (.220) -.696*** (.222) 
Legislator sex (Male = 1) .295** (.131) .262** (.130) 
% African-Americans in district .020*** (.005) .030*** (.006) 
Partisan affiliation*% African-
Americans in district 
 -.069*** (.009) 
% Private school enrollment -.017*** (.003) .020*** (.003) 
   
State level variables   
State educational expenditure -.187*** (.069) -.186** (.073) 
Previous legal challenge .304 (.659) -.409 (.684) 
% Unionization -.207*** (.060) -.217*** (.061) 
Constant 7.245*** (2.790) 7.096** (2.954) 
N = 6,026; p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.1*  
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Figure 1: The renaissance of vouchers - cumulative total of voucher 
programs in the United States, 1945-2016
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Figure 2: Selected southern states' issuance of vouchers in the era of 
segregation.
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Figure 3: Enrollment in the Milwaukee and Cleveland voucher programs 
as a proportion of the 5-18 year old population in each city
Milwaukee Cleveland
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Figure 4: Enrollments in voucher programs as a proportion of 5-19 year 
olds in selected states, 2005-2015
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Figure 6: Interaction between legislator partisanship and racial district characteristics 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
v
o
ti
n
g
 f
o
r 
v
o
u
ch
er
 b
il
l
0 20 40 60 80 100
% African American population in district
Democrat Republican
